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18 CV 8821

JUDGE KAPLAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MATTEL, INC.

Plaintiff

v.

1622758984, 1922529011, 3237063196, 3ADIANPU, AISAITO, AJKKXIAO, ALINA_ZLL, AMAKEUPSTORE, AMAPO, ANDREA-LOVEKOBÉ, AT THE BEGINNING OF LANGUAGE, BABY HI, BANGXING, BEAUTY, OUTDOOR AND ELECTRONIC, BEBEST, BENGBU TRADE LIMITED BY SHARE LTD, BEST HOPE, BLUESKY588, BURNING FIRE, BUYINFUN, C-BEAR, CECILIASTYLE, CHERRYSTORE6, CHINA SOUL, COCOMENGXIANGJIA, DE YANG, DIDIAO, DREAMTOP, ELYSIAN FIELDS, FANCYBABY JEWELRY, FANTASTIC5, FASHION MEMORIES, FASHIONGOGOGO, FASHIONISTAS, FATE STAY NIGHT, FATIONSHOP, FENGJIAN YU45033, FESENZ, FFBFDNDFNDRF, FIRMTOWN94, FPPF, GEORGE ELLIOT, GN SERVICE CO.LTD., GODEAL2017, GRACEQQ, GUANGZHOUFENGSEWANGJUYINGHUAMA OYIYOUXI ANGONGSI, GUOJUN1991@163.COM, HANGZHOUJINGPINBAOBAO, HAPPYDREAM2016, HEADACHES, HELLO BODY, HOME GOODS, HONG

CIVIL ACTION No.

**MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S 1)
EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR
A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER; 2) ORDER
RESTRAINING
ASSETS AND
MERCHANT
STOREFRONTS; 3)
AN ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE WHY
A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
SHOULD NOT
ISSUE; 4) ORDER
AUTHORIZING
ALTERNATIVE**

KONG QI SHENG, HONGXIN TRADING COMPANY, HYLL2016, IFOUND, JJACKON, JOHNY PAPI, JTD, JTWAREHOUSE, JUSTICE, KÉ, KISS YOUR LIFE, LINDAF JEWELRY, LINJUBUY, LINZHIHEN, LIPENG TRADING CO., LIMITED, LITTLLOVE, LONELY PLANET, LUCK2017, LUCKY DOG8, LUCKY-1, LUSYS, LY2016, MATCHBESTCT, MEIRENYUHA, MICROHAPPYWISE, MRROBINSON, MW1023214, MY TREASURE, NANJING MH COMPANY, NEWBEAR, NEWIN, NIUQI DIGITAL FRANCHISE, ORIENT INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO., LTD., PEACH PARTY, PEGGY, PERFECT ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD, QINGDAO TIANCHANGZHENGQUANSHIYEYOUXIANGONGSI, QIPILANGZHENPISHOUBAO, RFHBTGNDERFGBESDR, SAML, SAMLIR, SANDI MARKET, SHANGHAI YEE TONG TRADING CO., LTD., SHANGHAIBINJIAWANGLUOGONGCHENGYOUXIANGONGSI, SHANGHAIYEJIAJINCHUKOUYOUXIANGONGSI, SHENZHEN NATURE MAKER, SHENZHEN SAFE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD, SHENZHENSIXINGJIEXUNDIANZIYOUXIANGONGSI, SMALL HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES CONCENTRATION CAMP, SSSDD, SUNSHINE DAY, TAMIIX, TAOLIHUA, TAOZI123, THBDFDHG, THE COSMETICS, TOP FASHION CLUB, TOP MVP, TOPFASHIONTOWN, TOXIC PERFUME, TUKIISS, UNIQUE CREATE, VSHINE, WAGPUAL TACTICAL AIRSOFT WHOLESALE HOME, WANG'S, WANGPAI, WLOUDS, WEIWEIT, WEIWO999, WENMY, WHENEVER INTEREST, WX123456, XI LIAN, XIAOHHH, XIAOYANGO, XIAOYUPPP, XIEFANG625, XINXIANGSHICHENG6698, YANGFANSHANGMAO, YANGKAIJIE, YEHAOJJSTORE, YEMINQING, YIDAS, YIWU CITY HAOZHUO CRAFTS LIMITED COMPANY, YIWU XIANGPEI INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMPANY, YIWUSHIGUIKANGDIANZISHANGWUSHANGXING, YIWUYINHAI DIANZISHANGWUYOUXIANGONGSI, YONGYANONLINE, ZHOU DU STORES, ZIWEIXING ANGEL AGEL ECOMMERCE LTD and ZSDDP,

Defendants

**SERVICE BY
ELECTRONIC
MEANS AND 5)
ORDER
AUTHORIZING
EXPEDITED
DISCOVERY**

FILED UNDER SEAL

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GLOSSERY

Term	Definition
Plaintiff or “Mattel”	Mattel, Inc.
Defendants	<p>1622758984,1922529011, 3237063196, 3Adianpu, Aisaite, ajKKxiao, Alina_zll, Amakeupstore, AMAPO, Andrea-LoveKobe, At the beginning of language, baby hi, bangxing, Beauty, outdoor and electronic, Bebest, Bengbu trade Limited by Share Ltd, Best Hope, bluesky588, Burning Fire, BuyInFun, c-bear, ceciliastyle, cherrystore6, China Soul, CoComengxiangjia, De yang, DIdiao, DreamTop, Elysian Fields, Fancybaby Jewelry, Fantastic5, Fashion memories, FashionGOGOGO, Fashionistas, Fate Stay Night, Fationshop, fengjianyu45033, fesenz, ffbfdndfndrf, Firmtown94, FPDF, George Elliot, GN Service Co.Ltd., Godeal2017, Graceqq, guangzhoufengsewangjuyinghuamaoyiyouxiangongsi, guojun1991@163.com, hangzhoujingpinbaobao, happydream2016, headaches, hello body, Home Goods, Hong kong Qi Sheng, Hongxin Trading Company, hyll2016, ifound, jjackon, Johny Papi, JTD, JTWarehouse, Justice, Ké, Kiss Your Life, LinDaF Jewelry, linjubuy, linzhihen, LiPeng Trading Co., Limited, Littlelove, Lonely Planet, luck2017, Lucky dog8, LUCKY-1, lusys, LY2016, MatchBestCT, meirenyuha, microhappywise, MRRobinson, mw1023214, My Treasure, nanjing MH company, newbear, Newin, Niuqi digital franchise, Orient International Trading Co., Ltd., Peach Party, peggy, Perfect electronic technology co., LTD, qingdaotianchangzhengquanshiyeyouxiangongsi, qipilangzhenpishoubao, rfhbtgnderfgbesdr, samlir, Sandi Market, Shanghai Yee Tong Trading Co., Ltd., shanghaibinjiawangluogongchengyouxiangongsi, shanghaiyejjajinchukouyouxiangongsi, shenzhen nature maker, Shenzhen safe technology co., LTD, shenzhenshixingjiexundianziyouxiangongsi, Small household appliances concentration camp, sssdd, Sunshine Day, tamiix, taolihua, taozi123, thbfdfhg, The cosmetics, top fashion club, TOP_MVP, TopFashionTown, toxic perfume, tukiiss, UNIQUE CREATE, Vshine, waggual tactical airsoft wholesale home, Wang`s, wangpai, Wclouds, WEIWEIT, weiwo999, wenmy, Whenever interest, WX123456, Xi_Lian, xiaoHHH, xiaoyango, xiaoyuPPP, Xiefang625, xinxiangshicheng6698, yangfanshangmao, yangkaijie, yehaoJJstore, yeminqing, Yidas, yiwu city haozhuo crafts limited company, Yiwu Xiangpei International Trade Company,</p>

	yiwushiguikangdianzishangwushangxing, yiwuyinhaidianzishangwuyouxiangongsi, yongyanonline, Zhou Du Stores, ZIWEIXING angel Agel Ecommerce Ltd and ZSDDP
Complaint	Plaintiff's Complaint filed on September 26, 2018
Application	Plaintiff's <i>Ex Parte</i> Application for: 1) a temporary restraining order; 2) an order restraining assets and Merchant Storefronts (as defined <i>infra</i>); 3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; 4) an order authorizing alternative service and 5) an order authorizing expedited discovery filed on September 26, 2018
Arnaiz Dec.	Declaration of Jessica Arnaiz in Support of Plaintiff's Application
Adler Dec.	Declaration of Ray Adler in Support of Plaintiff's Application
Wolgang Dec.	Declaration of Spencer Wolgang in Support of Plaintiff's Application
UNO Marks	U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,005,397 for "UNO" for goods in Class 28 and U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 5,125,593 and 2,008,897 for the wordmark "UNO" in Classes 9 and 28
UNO Works	U.S. Copyright Reg. VA 561-564, covering the Original UNO Game Packaging, U.S. Copyright Reg. VA 2-090-581, covering the UNO Game Packaging (1999), U.S. Copyright Reg. VA 2- 090-583, covering the UNO Game Packaging (2001), U.S. Copyright Reg. VA 2-090-587, covering the UNO Game Packaging (2003)
Counterfeit Products or Infringing Products	Products bearing or used in connection with the UNO Marks and/or UNO Works, and/or products in packaging and/or containing labels bearing the UNO Marks and/or UNO Works, and/or bearing or used in connection with marks and/or artwork that are confusingly or substantially similar to the UNO Marks and/or UNO Works and/or products that are identical or confusingly or substantially similar to the UNO Products
User Accounts	Any and all websites, any and all accounts with online marketplace platforms such as Wish.com, as well as any and all as yet undiscovered accounts with additional online marketplace platforms held by or associated with Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all other persons in active concert with any of them
Merchant Storefronts	Any and all User Accounts through which Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them operate storefronts to manufacture, import, export, advertise, market, promote, distribute, display, offer for sale, sell and/or otherwise deal in products, including Counterfeit Products, which are held by or associated with Defendants, their respective officers,

	employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them
Defendants' Assets	All money, securities or other property or assets of Defendants (whether said assets are located in the U.S. or abroad)
Defendants' Financial Accounts	Financial accounts associated with or utilized by any Defendants or any Defendants' User Accounts or Merchant Storefront(s) (whether said account is located in the U.S. or abroad)
Financial Institutions	Any banks, financial institutions, credit card companies and payment processing agencies, such as ContextLogic, PayPal Inc. ("PayPal"), Payoneer Inc. ("Payoneer"), PingPong Global Solutions, Inc. ("PingPong"), and other companies or agencies that engage in the processing or transfer of money and/or real or personal property of Defendants
Third Party Service Providers	Online marketplace platforms, including, without limitation, those owned and operated, directly or indirectly, by ContextLogic, such as Wish, as well as any and all as yet undiscovered online marketplace platforms and/or entities through which Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them manufacture, import, export, advertise, market, promote, distribute, offer for sale, sell and/or otherwise deal in Counterfeit Products which are hereinafter identified as a result of any order entered in this action, or otherwise

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff submits this memorandum of law in support of its *ex parte* Application in light of Defendants' intentional and willful offering for sale and/or sales of Counterfeit Products. Courts often grant *ex parte* applications for relief in similar matters¹ and Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this Application.

Wish.com is a San Francisco, California-based, online marketplace and e-commerce platform owned by ContextLogic, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("ContextLogic"), that allows manufacturers and other third-party merchants, like Defendants, to advertise, distribute, offer for sale, sell and ship their retail products, which, upon information and belief, primarily originate from China,² directly to consumers worldwide and specifically to consumers residing in the U.S., including New York (hereinafter, "Wish"). See Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 3. Defendants are individuals and/or businesses, who, upon information and belief, are located in China but conduct business in the United States and other countries by means of their respective User Accounts and on their Merchant Storefronts on Wish, as well as any and all as yet undiscovered online marketplace platforms. See Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 4, 6, Adler Dec., ¶¶ 24-25 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 3. Through their Merchant Storefronts, Defendants offer for sale and/or sell consumer products, including Counterfeit Products, and market, distribute and ship such products to consumers throughout the

¹ See *In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A.*, 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that *ex parte* temporary restraining orders are indispensable to the commencement of an action when they are the sole method of preserving a state of affairs in which the court can provide effective final relief); see also, e.g., *JLM Couture, Inc. v. Aimibridal, et al.*, No. 18-cv-1565-JMF, Dkt. 18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2018); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Dongguan Opete Yoga Wear Manufacturer Co., Ltd., et al.*, No. 17-cv-9099 (JMF), Dkt. 19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2017); *Gucci America, Inc., et al v. Alibaba Group Holding LTD, et al*, No. 1:15-cv-03784 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015); *AW Licensing, LLC v. Bao*, No. 15- CV-1373, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015); *Klipsch Grp., Inc. v. Big Box Store Ltd.*, No. 1:12-cv-06283 (VSB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153137, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012).

² See Armando Roggio, *Ecommerce Lessons from the Wish Shopping App*, PRACTICALECOMMERCE (Jan. 7, 2015), available at <https://www.practicalecommerce.com/Ecommerce-Lessons-from-the-Wish-Shopping-App>.

world, including New York. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, 10-11, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶ 24 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 3. Third-party merchants operating Merchant Storefronts on Wish, like Defendants, as well as other online marketplace platforms, often use evasive tactics such as aliases, false addresses and other incomplete identification information to conceal their identities and avoid detection. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 12, 13. In fact, Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts are either devoid of any or contain incomplete information regarding Defendants' true identities, locations and contact information, making it virtually impossible for Plaintiff to obtain independently. *See id.*, ¶¶ 22-23.

Without Plaintiff's authorization or consent, Defendants were and/or currently are manufacturing, importing, exporting, advertising, marketing, promoting, distributing, displaying, offering for sale and/or selling Counterfeit Products to consumers located in the U.S., including New York, through their Merchant Storefronts. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 4-6, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶¶ 23-25 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15-18, Ex. A. Defendants' aforementioned actions have caused and will continue to cause – should the requested relief be denied – irreparable harm to Mattel's goodwill and reputation as well as to the unassuming consumers who will continue to believe that Defendants' inferior and potentially dangerous Counterfeit Products are authorized, sponsored, approved, endorsed and/or licensed by Plaintiff, when, in fact, they are not. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 29.

Plaintiff's request for *ex parte* relief is particularly necessary because if Defendants receive notice of this Lawsuit, it is highly likely that they will transfer, conceal and/or destroy 1) the Counterfeit Products, 2) the means of making or obtaining such Counterfeit Products, 3) business records and 4) any and all other evidence relating to their infringing activities. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 12. Moreover, they will likely hide or dispose of Defendants' Assets. *See id.* In light of the foregoing, and considering that it typically takes noticed Financial Institutions and/or Third Party

Service Providers a minimum of five (5) days to locate, attach and freeze Defendants' Assets and/or Defendants' Financial Accounts, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court order bifurcated service specifically allowing enough time for the Financial Institutions and/or Third Party Service Providers to comply with the TRO before ordering service on Defendants.

II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The facts are contained in the factual declarations of Ray Adler and Jessica Arnaiz and the attorney summarizing declaration of Spencer Wolfgang, plus accompanying exhibits. *See* Adler Dec., Arnaiz Dec., Wolfgang Dec. and Exhibits A-C to the Complaint. In the interest of brevity, any factual discussion is contained in the legal analysis below.³

III. ARGUMENT

A. THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS

Determining personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a federal question case requires a two-step inquiry. First, courts must look to the law of the forum state to determine whether personal jurisdiction will lie. *See Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank*, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing *Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker*, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007)). Second, if jurisdiction lies, the court then considers whether the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant comports with due process protections established under the United States Constitution. *See id.*; *see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). As alleged herein, Defendants' unlawful counterfeiting and infringing activities subject them to long-arm jurisdiction in New York under N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 302(a)(1).⁴ Furthermore, New

³ Although Plaintiff acknowledges that it seeks multiple forms of relief, in the interest of brevity and with respect for the Individual Rules and Practices in Civil Cases of each District Judge in the Southern District of New York, Plaintiff respectfully submits this twenty-five (25) page memorandum of law in support of its Application. Plaintiff will promptly provide supplemental briefing and/or oral argument on any issue should the Court request it.

⁴ Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendants are also subject to jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3), however, this alternative analysis is omitted for brevity. *See Energy Brands Inc.*, 571 F. Supp. at 470.

York's exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants thereunder comports with due process.

1. Defendants are Subject to Personal Jurisdiction Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)

Under § 302(a)(1), there are two requirements that must be met to establish personal jurisdiction: “(1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” *Licci*, 732 F.3d at 168 (quoting *Solé Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC*, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)). In applying the test for the “transacts business” prong of § 302(a)(1), “New York decisions ... tend to conflate the long-arm statutory and constitutional analyses by focusing on the constitutional standard,” ergo, “a defendant need not be physically present in New York to transact business there within the meaning of [this first prong],” so long as the defendant has engaged in “purposeful activity,” for example, “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” *Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC*, 616 F.3d 158, 169-71 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting *Best Van Lines, Inc.*, 490 F.3d at 246-247) (internal quotations omitted). The second prong of § 302(a)(1) requires an “articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted,” however, “a causal relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted” is not required. *Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li*, 135 F. Supp. 3d 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Rather, it is sufficient that “the latter is not completely unmoored from the former.” *Id.*

In determining whether a party has “transacted business,” New York courts must look at the totality of the circumstances concerning the party's interactions with, and activities within, the state. *See Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co.*, 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is permissible in the context of Internet activity is “directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the

Internet.” *Id.* Courts in this Circuit have regularly conferred personal jurisdiction on a given defendant based on that defendant’s operation of a fully interactive website through which consumers can access the site from anywhere and purchase products, as is the case with Defendants’ User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts, and allow for customers all over the world to communicate with Defendants and view and purchase products, including Counterfeit Products, as demonstrated by the order forms and checkout pages completed by NAL for and Epstein Drangel’s purchase of Counterfeit Products. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-15, Ex. A and Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 21, Ex. B; *see also* *Chloé*, 616 F.3d at 170.

Courts in this Circuit have also exercised jurisdiction over defendants under § 302(a)(1) where such defendants regularly offer for sale and sell goods through online marketplaces, “even though Defendants do not control their [] ‘storefront’ or its interactivity to the same extent that they control their own highly interactive website.” *Lifeguard Licensing Corp. v. Ann Arbor T-Shirt Co., LLC*, No. 15 Civ. 8459 (LGS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89149 *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2016) (quoting *EnviroCare Techs., LLC v. Simanovsky*, No. 11-CV-3458(JS)(ETB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78088 *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012)).⁵ Jurisdiction is proper “for internet sellers who use an internet storefront like Amazon,” – or in this case, Wish – when the Internet sellers are “commercial vendors who use it ‘as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum.’” *Id.* at *8.

Here, the fact that Defendants have chosen to open their respective User Accounts for the purpose of selling Counterfeit Products through their Merchant Storefronts on Wish as well as any and all as yet undiscovered online marketplace platforms alone supports a finding that Defendants have intentionally used Wish “as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum.”

⁵ *See also* Footnote 1.

EnviroCare Techs., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78088 at *10 (quoting *Boschetto v. Hansing*, 539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008)). Moreover, the fact that Defendants are offering the Counterfeit Products through their Merchant Storefronts usually in wholesale quantities and always at significantly below-market prices coupled with the fact that most of their User Accounts reflect multiple sales to consumers across the world, including repeat sales to consumers in the U.S., confirms that Defendants are sophisticated sellers operating commercial businesses through Wish.com, such that they are subject to jurisdiction. *See id.* at *10.

It is highly likely that Defendants have shipped Counterfeit Products to consumers in New York based on the following: 1) all Defendants provided confirmation to NAL indicating that they ship Counterfeit Products to New York, 2) NAL completed an order form or checkout page for an order of Counterfeit Products from each and every Defendant through an account associated with a New York Address and/or provided a New York Address as the shipping address, 3) all Defendants accept payment in U.S. dollars and 4) Epstein Drangel purchased five (5) Counterfeit Products. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 8-18, Ex. A and Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 12, Ex. B.

Nevertheless, whether a defendant physically shipped Counterfeit Products into New York is not determinative of whether personal jurisdiction exists, as courts in this Circuit examine a given defendant's online interactions with consumers in considering whether a particular defendant has transacted business in the forum state under § 302(a)(1). *See Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Pharel*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32249, at * 6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011). Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel and NAL have viewed Defendants' Counterfeit Products via their online User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts (*see* Arnaiz Dec., ¶ 7; Adler Dec., ¶ 25 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 16-17, Ex. A. NAL completed order forms or checkout pages for Counterfeit Products by providing a New York Address as the shipping address and Epstein Drangel purchased five (5) Counterfeit

Products.⁶ See Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 10-13, Ex. A and Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 21, Ex. B. Thus, Defendants' sophisticated commercial operations, specifically including their offering for sale and/or selling of Counterfeit Products through their highly interactive User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts on Wish, NAL's completion of order forms and/or checkout pages for and Epstein Drangel's purchase of Counterfeit Products, along with Defendants' own representations on their Merchant Storefronts that they ship Counterfeit Products to the U.S., including the New York Address, unequivocally establishes that Defendants conduct business within this District and the claims in this suit arise from Defendants' business dealings and transactions with consumers in New York.⁷ See *id.*, ¶¶ 10-18, Ex. A and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15-18, Ex. B.

2. Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Comports with Due Process

Asserting personal jurisdiction over Defendants also comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as Defendants have “certain minimum contacts ... such that maintenance of th[is] suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (quoting *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)). Defendants intentionally directed activity towards the New York market, thereby purposefully availing themselves of “the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (U.S. 1985); see *Best Van Lines, Inc.*, 490 F.3d at 243; see also Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 8-18, Ex. A and Wolfgang

⁶ Under case law of the Second Circuit, when analyzing personal jurisdiction in the Internet context, “traditional statutory and constitutional principles remain the touchstone of the inquiry”, and while a website's interactivity, “may be useful” for analyzing personal jurisdiction ‘insofar as it helps to decide whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York,” ... “it does not amount to a separate framework for analyzing internet-based jurisdiction.” *Best Van Lines, Inc.*, 490 F.3d at 252 (quoting *Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker*, No. 03 Civ. 6585 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7830, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2004) (internal citation omitted)).

⁷ Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which “provides for jurisdiction over a defendant if a claim arises under federal law, if the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state, and if the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” *Lechner v. Marco-Domo Internationales Interieur GmbH*, No. 03 Civ. 5664 (JGK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4022, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2005).

Dec., ¶¶ 15-17. Moreover, “as a practical matter, the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of jurisdiction in a broader range of circumstances of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, and a foreign defendant meeting the standards of § 302 will satisfy the due process standard.” *Energy Brands Inc.*, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 469. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this action.

B. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN *EX PARTE* TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Here, an *ex parte* order is essential to prevent immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff. A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the opposing party or that party's counsel where “it clearly appears from the specific facts shown by affidavit . . . that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Section 34 of the Lanham Act expressly authorizes this Court to issue *ex parte* restraining orders “with respect to a violation [of the Act] that consists of using a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(a).⁸

Once a violation of the Lanham Act is demonstrated, the issuance of an *ex parte* order is appropriate upon showing that: (i) the plaintiff will provide adequate security; (ii) any order other than an *ex parte* order is not adequate to achieve the purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (iii) the plaintiff has not publicized the requested *ex parte* order; (iv) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on showing that defendants are using counterfeit marks; (v) an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such *ex parte* order is not granted; (vi) the materials to be seized will be located at the place

⁸ Congress' purpose for enacting such *ex parte* remedies was to ensure that courts were able to effectively exercise their jurisdiction in counterfeiting cases and to prevent counterfeiters given prior notice from disappearing or quickly disposing of infringing inventory or records relating to their counterfeiting and illegal actions. *See* Senate-House Joint Explanatory Statement on trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 Cong. Rec. H12076, at 12080 (Oct. 10, 1984).

identified in the application; (vii) the harm to the plaintiff in denying the application outweighs the harm to defendants in granting the order and (viii) if prior notice was given, defendants would destroy, move, hide or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B). As discussed below, Plaintiff meets each of the relevant criteria for the issuance of an *ex parte* temporary restraining order under the Lanham Act.⁹

An *ex parte* temporary restraining order is particularly warranted in cases, such as the instant one, involving offshore counterfeiters who conceal their identities and engage in unlawful and harmful activities over the Internet to avoid revealing their actual locations and identities. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 11-13, 22-23. Defendants, who, upon information and belief, are located in China and operate their businesses exclusively over the Internet, knowingly and willfully offer for sale and/or sell Counterfeit Products through their User Accounts and on their Merchant Storefronts on Wish. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 4-7, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶ 25 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 3. The covert nature of Defendants and their counterfeiting activities make any order other than an *ex parte* temporary restraining order an exercise in futility. The immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiff's business and reputation, as well as to the goodwill associated with the UNO Marks and UNO Works, in denying its Application for an *ex parte* temporary restraining order greatly outweighs the harm to Defendants' interests in continuing to offer for sale and sell Counterfeit Products. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 29.

In order “[t]o obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: ‘(1) the likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of such an injunction, and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground

⁹ Plaintiff has expressed its willingness to provide security in conjunction with the *ex parte* relief it seeks. *See* [Proposed] Order, filed herewith. Plaintiff has certified that it has not publicized this Application. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 32. Also, since Defendants' location and the location of the Counterfeit Products are unclear, Plaintiff is not requesting a seizure order in this Application. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 22-23.

for litigation plus a balance of hardships tipping decidedly' in its favor.'" *Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.*, 426 F.3d 532, 537 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc.*, 201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2000)). The "standards which govern consideration of an application for a temporary restraining order... are the same standards as those which govern a preliminary injunction." *Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, Inc.*, 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992). As detailed below, Plaintiff has met the standard for a preliminary injunction and the Court should enter a temporary restraining order against Defendants.

1. Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm in the Absence of an Injunction Leaving Plaintiff with No Adequate Remedy at Law

Defendants' infringing activities must be stopped immediately to prevent any further harm to Plaintiff. Not only does Plaintiff stand to suffer lost profits as a result of Defendants' competing, substandard Counterfeit Products, Defendants' illicit activities destroy the inherent value of the UNO Marks, impair Plaintiff's reputation, dilute Plaintiff's brands and goodwill and negatively affect Plaintiff's relationships with its current customers as well as its ability to attract new customers. *See Adler Dec.*, ¶ 29. While courts may no longer presume irreparable harm upon a finding of infringement, "[i]rreparable harm exists in a trademark case when the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark . . . because loss of control over one's reputation is neither 'calculable nor precisely compensable.'" *U.S. Polo Ass'n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.*, 800 F.Supp.2d 515, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Further, a plaintiff may still demonstrate that "on the facts of the case, the failure to issue an injunction would actually cause irreparable harm." *Salinger v. Colting*, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing *eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC*, 547 U.S. 388, 393).

This Circuit recognizes that irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction

exists where defendant injected counterfeit versions of a plaintiff's products into the market. *See CJ Prods. LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC*, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Here, Defendants have sold substandard Counterfeit Products that look remarkably similar, if not identical, to the UNO Products and which embody, bear and/or incorporate the UNO Marks and/or UNO Works and/or identical or confusingly and/or substantially similar marks and/or works, thereby resulting in lost sales and impairing Plaintiff's reputation that it has achieved through the expenditure of considerable time and effort. *See Mitchell Grp. USA LLC v. Udeh*, No. 14-cv-5745, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18801 at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (internal citations omitted); Adler Dec., ¶ 29 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15-18.

Moreover, Defendants' counterfeiting and infringing activities deny Plaintiff of its fundamental right to control the quality of the goods sold under the UNO Marks. *See Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp.*, 571 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2009). Defendants are offering their substandard Counterfeit Products in wholesale quantities and at significantly below-market prices with which Plaintiff cannot compete given the high-quality materials and construction necessary to manufacture the UNO Products. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 28 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 20-21; *see also Zino Davidoff SA*, 71 F.3d 244

Also, because Defendants' substandard Counterfeit Products are virtually indistinguishable from the UNO Products, not only could any injury to consumers that results from use of Defendants' substandard Counterfeit Products be attributed to Plaintiff, thereby causing irreparable harm to Plaintiff in the form of unquantifiable lost sales, loss of goodwill and loss of control of its reputation with authorized licensees, retailers and consumers, but Plaintiff would also potentially be exposed to legal liability for any such injury to consumers. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 29 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 17, 20-21, 28. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in Plaintiff's favor.

2. Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Lanham Act Claims

In order to establish a likelihood of success on trademark counterfeiting and infringement claims, a plaintiff must show: (1) that its marks are valid and entitled to protection, and (2) that defendants' use of plaintiff's marks is likely to cause confusion. *See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.*, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).

First, the U.S. Trademark Registration certificates submitted in conjunction with this Application provide *prima facie* evidence of both the validity of the UNO Marks as well as Plaintiff's ownership of the same. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 10, Ex. A; 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).

Second, a proper likelihood of confusion inquiry generally involves an analysis of the factors set forth in *Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.* 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). Yet, "where counterfeit marks are involved, it is not necessary to conduct the step-by-step examination of each *Polaroid* factor because counterfeit marks are inherently confusing." *Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Filene's Basement, Inc.*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 368, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal citations omitted). Instead, "[t]he court need only determine the more fundamental question of whether there are items to be confused in the first place -- that is, whether the items at issue . . . are, in fact, counterfeit and whether [d]efendants sold those items, or offered those items for sale." *Id.* at 383 (internal citations omitted). Regardless, even if a *Polaroid* analysis were necessary, a straightforward application of the test clearly demonstrates that a likelihood of confusion exists in this case.

Finally, because Plaintiff has shown that it is likely to prevail on its trademark counterfeiting and trademark infringement claims, it has also shown that it likely will prevail on its claims for false designation of origin, passing off and unfair competition. *See Richemont N. Am., Inc. v. Linda Lin Huang*, No. 12 Civ. 4443 (KBF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136790, at *14-16 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2013).

a) *The UNO Marks are Strong and Distinctive*

In determining the strength of a mark, courts look to: “(1) inherent strength, resulting from the mark's degree of inherent distinctiveness, usually measured on the ladder ranging from unprotectable generic marks to arbitrary, fanciful marks that enjoy the broadest protection, and (2) acquired strength, reflecting the degree of consumer recognition the mark has achieved.” *Tcpip Holding Co. v. Haar Communs. Inc.*, 244 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2001). The UNO Marks are suggestive as applied to the goods with which they are associated, and have acquired distinctiveness from being prominently used in connection with the UNO Products, which have achieved worldwide recognition and fame. *See* Adler Dec., ¶¶ 10-11, Ex. A. Additionally, Plaintiff's federal trademark registrations for the UNO Marks further demonstrates the strength of the same. *See id.*; *see also Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.*, 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986). Likewise, the UNO Marks are suggestive as applied to the goods with which they are associated, as they “require imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods,” and thus, the UNO Marks are inherently distinctive and are thereby entitled to trademark protection “without proof of secondary meaning.” *Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc.*, 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Beyond the above, several of the UNO Marks, specifically U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 1,005,397 and 2,008,897, have been in continuous use in commerce for more than five (5) years, and as a result of “having been used exclusive and continuously” they are “now incontest[a]ble.” *Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Doony & Bourke, Inc.*, 454 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2006); *see* 15 U.S.C. § 1065; *see also* Adler Dec., ¶ 12. When a trademark has obtained “incontestable status, ‘secondary meaning is conclusively presumed.’” *A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Estate of Marilyn Monroe*, 131 F. Supp. 3d 196, 215 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2015) (quoting *PAJ, Inc. v. Barons Gold Mfg. Corp.*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14227, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2002). Incontestable marks are afforded “a conclusive

presumption of distinctiveness.” *Savin Corp. v. Savin Group*, 391 F.3d 439, 457 (2d Cir. 2004).

Thus, this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.

b) Defendants’ Counterfeit Products and Marks are Virtually Identical to the UNO Products and UNO Marks

Defendants have applied identical copies of the UNO Marks to their substandard, Counterfeit Products and/or used identical copies of the UNO Marks in marketing and promoting their substandard, Counterfeit Products on Defendants’ User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶¶ 24-25 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15-17. Defendants’ Counterfeit Products are clearly designed to look as much like the UNO Products as possible, without the quality and workmanship. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 25; Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17; *see also Rado Watch Co. v. ABC, Co.*, No. 92 Civ. 3657 (PKL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8356, *11 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Only minor differences exist between the Counterfeit Products and the UNO Products, which have no bearing on a finding of likelihood of confusion. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶ 25 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17.; *see also Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp.*, 111 F.3d 993, 1004-1005 (2d Cir. 1997). Further, courts do “not look with much favor on the businessman who, out of the wealth of words available, chooses as a trademark one which comes as close as he dares to a well-known mark on the identical product.” *A. T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc.*, 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972).

c) Defendants’ Counterfeit Products Directly Compete with the UNO Products and There is No Gap to Bridge

In considering the proximity of the products in the market, the concern is “competitive proximity,” meaning “whether and to what extent the two products compete with each other.” *Cadbury Beverages Inc. v. Cott Corp.*, 73 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 1996). In assessing the proximity of the parties’ products, courts “look to the nature of the products themselves and the structure of the relevant market. Among the considerations germane to the structure of the market are the class

of customers to whom the goods are sold, the manner in which the products are advertised, and the channels through which the goods are sold.” *Id.* (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[T]he closer the secondary user’s goods are to those the consumer has seen marketed under the prior user’s band, the more likely that the consumer will mistakenly assume a common source.” *Virgin Enterprises v. Nawab*, 335 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2003). In this case, the class of customers for both the Counterfeit Products and the UNO Products are the same retail consumers, so this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

Further, where, as here, Defendants are offering for sale and selling products that are virtually identical in kind, but not in quality to the UNO Products, bearing counterfeit and/or infringing marks in the same class of goods under which Plaintiff sells its UNO Products, they are already in competitive proximity and there is no “gap” to bridge. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶¶ 25, 28 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17; *see also Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc.*, 588 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2009).

d) Actual Confusion Can Be Inferred Between Defendants’ Counterfeit Products and the UNO Products

Seeing as Defendants are offering for sale and/or selling counterfeit versions of the UNO Products under the UNO Marks, or a confusingly similar mark, actual confusion can be inferred. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶¶ 25, 28 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15, 17. Plaintiff, however, does not need to prove actual confusion, only a likelihood of confusion to obtain equitable relief. *See Prot. One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. v. Exec. Prot. One Sec. Serv., LLC*, 553 F. Supp. 2d 201, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

e) Defendants Acted in Bad Faith

Given that Defendants’ choice of marks, which are virtually identical to the UNO Marks and used in connection with the offering for sale and/or sale of virtually identical products, it can

be presumed that Defendants intended to trade off of the goodwill and reputation of Plaintiff, its UNO Products and UNO Marks. See Arnaiz Dec., ¶ 6, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶ 25 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 17-18, Ex. A.; see also *Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc.*, 831 F. Supp. 123, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). If Defendants' counterfeiting and infringing actions are found to be willful, "likelihood of confusion will be presumed as a matter of law." *N.Y. State Soc'y of CPA's v. Eric Louis Assocs.*, 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

f) Defendants' Counterfeit Products Are of Inferior Quality

The UNO Products are manufactured with high quality materials. See Adler Dec., ¶ 27. Plaintiff has neither authorized Defendants' use of the UNO Marks or confusingly similar marks in connection with the Counterfeit Products, nor approved or tested Defendants' Counterfeit Products being offered for sale and/or sold under or in connection with the UNO Marks and/or confusingly similar marks. See Adler Dec., ¶ 26. Hence, Defendants have encroached on Plaintiff's right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under its UNO Marks. See *Polymer Technology Corp. v. Mimran*, 975 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1992). In light of the above, this factor further supports a finding of likelihood of confusion.

g) The Sophistication of Purchasers

"Where the purchasers of a products are highly trained professionals, they know the market and are less likely than untrained consumers to be misled or confused by the similarity of different marks." *Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab*, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003). In contrast, ordinary "retail customers," (*i.e.*, the consumers of Plaintiff's and Defendants' products), "are not expected to exercise the same degree of care as professional buyers, who are expected to have greater powers of discrimination." *Pretty Girl, Inc. v. Pretty Girl Fashions, Inc.*, 778 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268-269 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Thus, this factor favors Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits.

3. Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on Its Copyright Act Claims

Under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), in order to show likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright infringement claim, a given plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” *Kwan v. Schlein*, 634 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co.*, 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). As detailed below, Defendants have infringed upon the UNO Works.

a) Plaintiff owns Valid Copyrights in the UNO Works

With respect to ownership, “[a] certificate of registration from the United States Register of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the valid ownership of a copyright.” *Mint, Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49813, at *6; *see also* 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Thus, Plaintiff’s certificates of registration for the UNO Works are *prima facie* evidence of the validity of the copyrights and the facts stated in such registrations. *See* Adler Dec., ¶ 14, Ex. B.

b) Defendants Infringed the UNO Works

To establish infringement, “the copyright owner must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant has actually copied the plaintiff’s work; and (2) the copying is illegal because a substantial similarity exists between the defendant’s work and the protectible [sic] elements of plaintiff’s [work].” *Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ Inc.*, 262 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2001).

A plaintiff may demonstrate actual copying “either by direct or indirect evidence.” *P&G v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 199 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). “Indirect copying may be shown by demonstrating that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the similarities between the works are probative of copying.” *Id.*

A representative sample of side-by-side comparisons of Plaintiff’s UNO Works to Defendants’ Infringing Products and/or Defendants’ Infringing Listings illustrates that Defendants are copying one or more of the UNO Works by reproducing and/or displaying substantially similar,

if not identical, imitations of the UNO Works either embodied in the Infringing Products themselves and/or in connection with the offering for sale and/or sale of Infringing Products. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A; Adler Dec., ¶ 24; and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 16-18, Ex. A. Defendants have taken the original and well-known elements of the UNO Works – comprised of the packaging of the UNO Products and associated artwork – and used the same and/or elements thereof in Defendants’ Infringing Listings for their Infringing Products. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 16-18, Ex. A. Defendants’ imitations of the UNO Works are virtually indistinguishable therefrom, which, coupled with Plaintiff’s significant and widespread advertising efforts, show that Defendants unquestionably had “access” to the UNO Works. *See id.*; *Mint, Inc. v. Iddi Amad*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49813, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011); and *Stora v. Don’t Ask Why Outfitters*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170172, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2016). Plaintiff has demonstrated, at a minimum, “evidence of a reasonable possibility of access” through its widespread use of its UNO Works as well as the extensive advertising and widespread distribution of the UNO Products. *Gaste v. Kaiserman*, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988). This demonstrates that Plaintiff’s assertion of Defendants’ access to the UNO Works is more than mere speculation.

Further, Defendants’ infringing use of the UNO Works is clearly more than *de minimis*. Defendants have taken entire and/or core elements of the UNO Works and have used these, or nearly identical replicas thereof, in connection with the advertising, marketing, distributing, offering for sale and/or sale of the Infringing Products. In many instances, Defendants have directly copied one or more of the individual components of the UNO Works and have used such elements together in Defendants’ Infringing Listings. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 16-18, Ex. A, and Arnaiz Dec., Ex. A. Thus, Plaintiff has established substantial similarity between the UNO Works and Defendants’ imitations, and that Defendants copied the same. *See Tufenkian Import/Export*

Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its copyright claims.

4. Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on Its State Law Claims

Because Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on its Lanham Act claims, Plaintiff has also shown a likelihood of success on its deceptive trade practices, false advertising, unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims under New York State law. *See N. Am. Olive Oil Ass'n v. Kangadis Food Inc.*, 962 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

5. The Balance of Hardships Favors Plaintiff

The balance of hardships unquestionably and overwhelmingly favors Plaintiff. Here, as described above, Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm to its business, the value, goodwill and reputation built up in and associated with the UNO Marks and UNO Works and to its reputation as a result of Defendants' willful and knowing sales of substandard imitations of the UNO Products. *See Adler Dec.*, ¶ 24. In contrast, any harm to Defendants would only be the loss of Defendants' ability to continue to offer their Counterfeit Products for sale, or, in other words, the loss of the benefit of being allowed to continue to unfairly profit from their illegal and infringing activities. "Indeed, to the extent defendants 'elect[] to build a business on products found to infringe[,] [they] cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against continuing infringement destroys the business so elected.'" *Broad. Music, Inc. v. Prana Hosp., Inc.*, 158 F. Supp. 3d 184, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal citation omitted).

6. Enjoining Defendants from Using the UNO Marks and UNO Works Will Serve the Public Interest

The public interest will be served by the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, as "the public has an interest in not being deceived—in being assured that the mark it associates with a product is not attached to goods of unknown origin and quality."

N.Y.C. Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Here, the public has an interest in being able to rely on the high quality of the UNO Products bearing and/or sold in connection with the UNO Marks and UNO Works. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶ 28. Since Defendants have willfully and knowingly inserted substandard Counterfeit Products into the marketplace, the public would benefit from a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction halting any further sale and distribution of Defendants' Counterfeit Products. *See* Arnaiz Dec., ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 15-17.

C. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER PREVENTING 1) THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER OF ASSETS AND 2) FREEZING DEFENDANTS' MERCHANT STOREFRONTS

1. Defendants' Assets Must be Frozen

Considering the nature of Defendants' counterfeiting businesses, and Plaintiff's showing that it has a high likelihood of succeeding on the merits of all of its claims, Plaintiff will be entitled to an equitable accounting of Defendants' profits from their sales of Counterfeit Products. Plaintiff's request for an asset freeze order granting Plaintiff information regarding the location of Defendants' Assets, the attachment of Defendants' Assets and an injunction preventing the transfer from or to Defendants' Financial Accounts by the Financial Institutions and Third Party Service Providers is both necessary and appropriate, and is within this Court's discretion to preserve Plaintiff's right to the relief sought in the Complaint. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).¹⁰

District courts have the "authority to freeze those assets which could [be] used to satisfy an equitable award of profits." *North Face Apparel Corp. v. TC Fashions, Inc.*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14226, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006) (internal citation omitted). In doing so, a court

¹⁰ *See also, e.g., Balenciaga Am., Inc. v. Dollinger*, No. 10 Civ. 2912 (LTS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107733, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2010).

“may exempt any particular assets from the freeze on the ground that they [are] not linked to the profits of allegedly illegal activity.” *Id.* at *11. Yet, the onus is on “the party seeking relief [from any such asset freeze] to ‘present documentary proof’” that its profits do not stem from such illegal activity. *Id.*

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), a plaintiff in an action arising thereunder is entitled to recover a defendant’s profits derived from the counterfeiting and/or infringement and/or plaintiff’s damages. *See Gucci Am. v. Bank of China*, 768 F.3d 122, 131-132 (2d Cir. 2014) (A copyright and/or trademark “infringer is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains to the true owner,” and “profits are then allowed as an equitable measure of compensation.”). Specifically, with respect to claims involving the infringement of federally registered copyrighted works and/or those arising under the Lanham Act, it has been established in this Circuit, as well as sister circuits, that district courts have the authority to issue a prejudgment asset restraint injunction in favor of plaintiffs seeking an accounting and/or another equitable remedy against allegedly infringing defendants. *See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. Doe*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190098 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014).

An asset freeze in the instant matter is unquestionably warranted because Defendants, who are foreign individuals and/or entities based in China, are manufacturing, importing, exporting, advertising, marketing, promoting, distributing, displaying, offering for sale and/or selling Counterfeit Products to U.S. consumers solely via the Internet, and accepting payment for such Counterfeit Products in U.S. Dollars through Financial Institutions, thereby causing irreparable harm to Plaintiff in the form of lost sales, loss of goodwill and loss of control of its reputation with licensees, retailers and consumers, and can, and most certainly have the incentive to, transfer and hide their ill-gotten funds if their assets are not frozen. *See Arnaiz Dec.*, ¶¶ 6-18, Ex. A; Adler

Dec., ¶ 24; *see also Dama S.P.A. v. Doe*, No. 15-cv-4528 (VM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2015).¹¹ Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should exercise its inherent equitable power and freeze Defendants' Assets and Defendants' Financial Accounts for the purpose of preserving Defendants' funds and ensuring that a meaningful accounting of their profits can be made.¹²

2. Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts Must be Frozen

A temporary restraining order which, in part, restrains the Third Party Service Providers from providing services to Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts is warranted and necessary because the continued offering for sale and/or sale of the Counterfeit Products by Defendants on their Merchant Storefronts will result in immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff. *See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li*, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2014) and *AW Licensing, LLC v. Bao*, No. 15-CV-1373, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015).

D. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER AUTHORIZING ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS BY ELECTRONIC MEANS

Fed. R. Civ. P. (4) governs service on Defendants in the instant matter since, upon information and belief, they are located in China. While Defendants operate sophisticated commercial businesses, they are limited to correspondence by email, messaging through their respective User Accounts and communications otherwise transmitted over the Internet. *See Arnaiz Dec.*, ¶¶ 6-18, Ex. A. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that this Court issue an order granting it permission to serve each respective Defendant via the following combination of electronic methods: 1) registered electronic mail and 2) website publication.

¹¹ *See also* Footnote 1.

¹² Upon the entering of an asset freeze, Plaintiff also requests that the Court Order Defendants and/or the Financial Institutions and/or the Third Party Service Providers to immediately identify Defendants' Assets and Defendants' Financial Accounts and the respective current account or fund balances of the same.

Plaintiff may serve international defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3), which enables a court to grant an alternative method of service so long as it: “(1) is not prohibited by international agreement; and (2) comports with constitutional notions of due process.” *SEC v. Anticevic*, No. 05 CV 6991 (KMW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11480, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2009). Notably, “[s]ervice under subsection [4(f)] (3) is neither a last resort nor extraordinary relief. It is merely one means among several which enables service of process on an international defendant.” *Sulzer Mixpac AG*, 312 F.R.D. 329, 330. Since third-party merchants on Wish, like Defendants, have been known to use aliases, false addresses and other incomplete identification information to shield their true identities and there are, in fact, no physical addresses whatsoever associated with the majority of Defendants’ User Accounts, this is exactly the circumstance where the courts should exercise, as they previously have,¹³ the authority to grant alternative methods of service. *See id.* “The decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” *Id.*¹⁴

In the instant matter, Plaintiff proposes using Outlook.com as well as RPost (www.rpost.com), an online service that confirms valid proof of authorship, content, and delivery of an email, as well as the official time and date that the email was sent and received. *See Wolfgang Dec.*, ¶ 24. Along with service via email, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court, in its

¹³ *See Dama S.P.A.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *6-7; *AW Licensing, LLC*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *18-19; *FTC v. PCCare247 Inc.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, at *20.

¹⁴ Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P (4)(1), service may be effected “by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents” (“Hague Convention”). Although China is a signatory to it, the Hauge Convention “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” *See Hague Convention*, November 15, 1965, Article 1. Moreover, despite China’s objection to service by postal channels under Article 10, this Court has held that such objection does not include service by email and further, that service by email is not prohibited by any international agreement. *See Sulzer Mixpac AG v. Medenstar Indus. Co.*, 312 F.R.D. 329, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

discretion, permit service via website publication.¹⁵

Ultimately, service on Defendants by various electronic means comports with due process, as it is “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 309. None of the Defendants have disclosed their mailing addresses. *See* Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 22-23. Due to Defendants’ purposeful anonymity, service by email, with confirmation of delivery by RPost, and website publication is most likely to provide Defendants with proper notice of this action and Plaintiff’s claims. *See Dama S.P.A.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *7. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully submits that an order authorizing alternative service benefits all parties and the Court by ensuring that Defendants receive immediate notice of the pendency of this action to move forward expeditiously.¹⁶

E. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER AUTHORIZING EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

Additionally, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court order expedited discovery from Defendants, Financial Institutions and Third Party Service Providers regarding the scope and extent of Defendants’ counterfeiting and infringing activities, as well as Defendants’ account details and other information relating to Defendants’ Financial Accounts, Assets and/or any and all User Accounts and or Financial Accounts with the Third Party Service Providers, including, without limitation any and all websites, any and all User Accounts and any and all Merchant Storefronts, including, without limitation, those owned and operated, directly or indirectly, by the

¹⁵ Publication on a website has been deemed appropriate service under Fed. R. Civ. P (4)(3) “so long as the proposed publication is ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” *National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does*, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824, 826 W.D.N.C. 2008) (quoting *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 315-16).

¹⁶ Plaintiff also respectfully submits that the Court issue an order authorizing Plaintiff to serve the Financial Institutions and/or Third Party Service Providers with notice of the Court’s order of the Application via electronic means prior to serving Defendants and with enough time for the Financial Institutions and/or Third Party Service Providers to comply with the Court’s order to help expedite the process.

Third Party Service Providers and the Financial Institutions.

Generally, a party may not seek discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference unless authorized by a court order. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). In the past, Courts in this District have often applied a four-factor test to determine when expedited discovery may be granted,¹⁷ but now apply a more flexible “good cause” test to examine “the discovery request . . . on the entirety of the record to date and the *reasonableness* of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” *Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina*, 233 F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal citation omitted). Regardless of which test, Plaintiff has established that it is entitled to the expedited discovery requested for good cause shown. *See id.* at 327; *see also* Adler Dec., ¶ 24 and Wolfgang Dec., ¶¶ 11-13, 22-23.

F. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR A SECURITY BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF \$5,000 IS ADEQUATE

In determining the amount of the bond that a moving party must post, this Court is “vested with wide discretion.” *Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart*, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff respectfully submits the provision of security in the amount of \$5,000 is sufficient. *See Rovio Entertainment Ltd. and Rovio Animation OY v. Best Baby and Kid Store, et al.*, No. 17-cv-4884-KPF, Dkt. 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2017).¹⁸

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that its Application be granted *ex parte* in its entirety.

Dated: September 26, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

EPSTEIN DRANGEL LLP

¹⁷*See Advanced Portfolio Techs., Inc. v. Advanced Portfolio Techs., Ltd.*, No. 94 Civ. 5620 (JFK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18457, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1994).

¹⁸ Moreover, this Court has gone as far as to hold that no security bond is necessary in similar circumstances. *See Ontel Products Corp. v. Airbrushpainting Makeup Store a/k/a Airbrushespainting, et al.*, No. 17-cv-871 (KBF), Dkt. 20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2017).

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